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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce 
entered in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah on January 14, 1992. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(g) 
(Supplement 1989) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion by 
awarding defendant alimony in the sum of $1,500.00 per month for 
the first twelve months from the date of trial and $1,000.00 per 
month for three years thereafter, in light of the disparity of 
income between the parties, the length of marriage, defendant's 
age, lack of specified job training or skills, her financial 
needs and economic obligations, including the care of her own 
children. 
2. Whether the Court misinterpreted or misapplied the 
law as set forth in Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 
1991) in failing to equalize the parties' standard of living or 
opportunities. 
3. Whether the Court abused its discretion in not 
allowing defendant to present evidence of her economic needs and 
circumstances arising from the primary care of her children from 
a prior marriage and in failing to make findings of fact related 
to the defendant's financial needs. 
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4. Whether the Court abused its discretion by 
ordering defendant to be responsible for one-half of substantial 
marital debts and obligations in light of a significant disparity 
between plaintiff and defendant's ability to earn income and to 
pay or satisfy such obligations. 
5. Whether the Court abused its discretion by failing 
to provide defendant an award or any other consideration for her 
premarital equity and in failing to adhere to legal standards 
related to the recognition of premarital contributions. 
6. Whether the Court abused its discretion in failing 
to award defendant a significant contribution towards reasonable 
attorney's fees and court costs in light of the defendant's 
inability to pay and the extreme disparity of income between 
plaintiff and defendant. 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(1) (1989). 
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY - MAINTENANCE OF HEALTH CARE OF 
PARTIES AND CHILDREN - COURT TO HAVE CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION - CUSTODY AND VISITATION - TERMINATION OF 
ALIMONY - NON-MERITORIOUS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION. 
1. When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the Court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, and parties . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Glen Paul Willey, the plaintiff-appellee in this 
matter, filed a Complaint for divorce against his wife, Rosalind 
Ann Willey, on January 8, 1991. Mrs. Willey subsequently filed a 
counterclaim seeking alimony, a fair and equitable division of 
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property, recognition of a premarital contribution and attorney's 
fees. 
The case was tried before the Honorable David S. Young 
on November 21 and 22, 1991. Each side was represented by 
counsel and presented documentary and testimonial evidence. In 
addition, Mr. Willey called as a witness, the Appellant's 
employer who presented evidence related to her rate of pay and 
lack of benefits. Mrs. Willey called as witnesses a vocational 
management expert, her brother-in-law and her counsel. Following 
presentation of the evidence and closing arguments, the trial 
court issued its ruling. Thereafter Findings of Fact Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce were signed and entered on January 
14, 1992. 
The rulings of the trial court applicable to the issues 
on appeal were as follows: 
1. Defendant was awarded alimony in the amount of 
$1,500.00 per month for a period of twelve months from the date 
of trial. Thereafter, alimony was reduced to $1,000.00 per month 
for three years, at which time alimony would terminate. 
2. The Court ordered that the parties' home be sold 
and after deducting the costs of sale and all liens, the parties 
were to be equally responsible for any remaining deficiencies or 
share the remaining equity. 
3. The Court ordered the parties to share equal 
responsibility for the payment of plaintiff's loan with First 
Interstate Bank in the approximate amount of $11,600.00. 
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4. The Court denied defendant's request for a 
consideration of premarital contribution holding that plaintiff's 
premarital property had been co-mingled in subsequent purchases 
of marital residence• 
5. Finally, the Court found that Appellant was 
capable of earning between $1,500 and $2,000 per month, but 
failed to adopt any findings related to her needs or expenses. 
The Court further found that appellee could earn $110,000 per 
year. 
Copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce are attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibits 
A and B and are, by this reference, incorporated herein. 
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal on February 
5, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Marital History. 
The parties were married on April 29, 1982 in Salt Lake 
City, Utah; each had been married before. Defendant, now age 42, 
had custody of three minor children from a prior marriage, two of 
whom remained minors as of the date of divorce. Defendant owned 
her own home with equity of $29,000, her household furnishings, 
an automobile and gifted stocks; prior to her marriage, she was 
employed full-time in retail clothing earning approximately 
$10,000 per year. (TR 9 and 212). 
Plaintiff, then age 31, had just begun working as a 
stockbroker at Kidder Peabody after having been out of work for a 
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number of months. Ho brought; to lr-* marriaa^ ar. --itomobi!^ ^ nd 
mir- ^ personal possess i mi1 | l if r1 il 
* J J .-
 t • income and success as a si^ckbiokei gr;ew quicKiy 
.Exhibit [)) allowing Mrs, Wiliey tt- work Dart-time through 
1981? and i-^ n^ only sparingly 'VKI a hobbyi? f 
< U'.'tobei lIL*9U he nu Lo**^. * ***-.; *. . i-<<r - in Ldge 
continue. 
* * -loyment History -
5 • ; " ° " -Lrou.ih n-,* • r •: -. I date in 1991, plaintiff 
remained employed as a stockbroker with Kidder Peabody earning 
the fol lowing amounts of money ii i the last s i x yea i: s o f the 
1986 $120,087.44 
1987 138,052.25 
1988 116,640.41 
1989 73,095.60 
1990 98,091.68 
1991 126,095.621 
A .._._..:: jrred 
income over $1^5,u00 ,;: ,*- , - :ar yea* * r ,,< court 
found, for purposes • f fixing ai'^onv t v ^ - i^co ^rveHe^'-
i -^u L. to 
earn incvm. *: : *. . pe • ., • unservetive" ^ erage 
(Decision, p.8) In additio* -intiff received a benefit 
package of 1 lea ] tl 11 i • benel i, I. s 
Year to date to November ] , 1991 
worth $12,200 per year together with travel allowances and 
potential bonuses•2 
Mrs. Willey worked part-time from 1983 through 1990 
earning the following: 
1983 $ 4,810 
1984 5,011 
1985 6,871 
1986 1,556 
1987 1,323 
1988 470 
1989 0 
1990 4,410 
Mrs. Willey became a full-time homemaker and mother 
until the separation required her to return to full-time work in 
1991. In 1990, Mrs. Willey became employed as a salesperson at A 
Women's Place Bookstore earning $5.00 per hour. She supplemented 
her income by leading literary groups formed through her 
bookstore. Mrs. Willey's average income for all years worked was 
not greater than $2,809 (Exhibit 34 D) and her gross monthly 
income at the time of trial from all sources was $860. Mrs. 
Willey also received $332 as a contribution to child support for 
the care of her two minor children. 
Both parties have college educations. Mrs. Willey, 
however, has had no vocational training other than her part-time 
clothing or book sales jobs, and has no skills which would allow 
her to effectively compete in the current job market. 
Accordingly, she requested rehabilitative alimony to allow her to 
2Bonus for 1987, receivable in 1992 was $14,212; bonus for 
1990 receivable on January 2, 1995 was $11,003; bonus projected 
for 1991 receivable in 1996 was $16,219 (TR at 151). 
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update her educat io ua s and vocationd± s^J 11s , 
F ] I <^ r* r^ :rr ^ g 
- _, - , .. ,, . . clcvdi.i market 
experience : n Tit n :.erim» 
The years between 2 0 a*- 30 are profitable. .Or.viously, 
between 30 and iC those are pretty critical years in a 
women's career. She has not been doing anything 
professional during that period of time to enhance ski I Il s 
(TR 129). 
Mrs ••• "hd^'dson'c recommends4' uau mLa. winey 
I — marry 1-hat- with 
working luil-turur ai. i getting that or, the ;- Ih^ < sirru.-i
 t 
compounds *.ne x •• fakes and -he is ^hnrr > '-"--- '* '"'-  ' i) 
I- - IdL 
Mrs. Wiliev
 Ai .. lowed euuccu iona . renaoilItation, woulo be 
"batt 1 ing * i Lh - wel r are s 11 uation" . ( TP ' 
T 
speciiic tiuuxi'ig related Lu d- L* - • :ant ^ ^arn-ng abil ry; 
12. . , the court, further finds that defendant . - capable 
of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,::*0 per month 
based on her education and qualif i<~*+- i ^nc * :° 
Maj a 
Appellant *ned her O W L * * Loqan Avenue prior to 
the partie-' n><— ^ 's-u J I f. I. " I 1 1 1 
s o I"l i f"\|: M^ *. v. . .,-• pui Aliased Appellant & 
grandmother f s house ^ Lynnwuod Ur i w- r o; $92 r 7 00 , us ing her 
premarital P Q U ?-« ^ u aauitional muni "HT'-wnd finm Appf Nihil " > 
: --* ^rovement^ Tho T;1<1J.,ood Uiive home was then 
sole ;.\ Ma\ -.r >i30,0(K . — ing equity of; $59,645, al- ~~ 
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which was used as a down payment on the purchase of the parties' 
present home on Maywood Drive. 
According to Appellant's testimony, Mr. Willey always 
regarded Mrs. Willey's equity as her separate property and 
assured her that he would not and did not treat the original 
equity as a marital contribution. (TR 213-214) 
In 1989 at Mr. Willey's request, a second trust deed 
was executed as security for earlier borrowings from Mrs. 
Willeyfs parents (the Johnson's), for home improvements on the 
Lynnwood Drive home as well as some $25,000 borrowed to pay for 
the purchase of Mr. Willey's 450 SEL Mercedes. In order to 
deduct the interest payments on his tax returns, the note was 
secured by a deed of trust against the parties' Maywood Drive 
house. 
Appellant argued that the second note dated March 1, 
1987 for $25,000 should be considered as a separate marital 
obligation which Mr. Willey ought to pay, thus allowing appellant 
enough proceeds from the eventual sale of the Maywood Drive home 
to reimburse her for her original premarital investment. The 
District Court held that Appellant's subsequent uses of her 
premarital equity constituted a co-mingling of her assets and, 
after holding that both notes be deducted from the sale proceeds, 
since there likely would be no equity after the sale of the home, 
it denied her claim for a premarital distribution. (TR at 8). 
9 
Appellant's Heal :J 
ut .il I I , tumor " ;.<^ , ..luruu, .j,^ iObi a lui J - months 
work as a result ci nat operation and ua> ,-: » ei -.rninq t 
surae»v K-. * ; •• • , - - LCIJL. App* 
i .* «_-.: iuedical conditK,L .,a ..,*. .^  
existence or such tumors, sK*-: must have continued medical check-
ups and tests and may be mc1*^ *"• * "^tible to si. • 
( is:ii I::i :: i 1 1 " pf: sear* c . .. . ._„. . ,4^t 
covered D> iny other health insurance L: rder to continue 
COBRA coverage undei *>*r . I V I M ^ V ' 1 >M> * *f - ~ - * 3*- r v " f O 
p- < ::1 ler s. -- u_i. 
deductibles ana -o-payments. 
Mr. WiIl^v i the other hand, receives the benefits oi 
e : .. j • . per 
year cafeteria pxaji f, ^  t ibets any JI.I -of pocket, co-payments, 
tax free. 
During the marriage, the parties enjoyed . fortable 
t<; n.yh standard ot i\.. snnual vacations driv -ig 
expensive automobiles 
social engagemt,,,r ,, , ^cnajj. . ,earing expensive jutninq and 
providing private schooling tor Mrs. Wiiii-v - children. I 
addition, v~ - ' ''- - :*vr:d p*=*r . . . 
c .-,u -.. ,fc -^ ai- *^  "1 • di a c o general „y spen *** m t^-v 
made. However, plaintiff was always careful __ jave significant 
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amounts of money should trading in the stock market produce lean 
times. At one time in 1987, Mr. Willey testified he had over 
$100,000 in the bank from numerous sources. (TR 202) 
In 1989, Mr. Willey experienced a comparatively bad 
year of production. That caused marital trouble and some 
financial stress, however, not so much that Mr. Willey changed 
much of his standard of living. He continued to spend over $200 
per month on a personal body trainer and enjoyed European and 
personal trips. (TR 272). 
Following their separation in November 1990, the 
parties agreed and the trial court approved a Temporary Order of 
Support requiring plaintiff to maintain all of the parties' debts 
and obligations including the first mortgage on the home of 
approximately $2,600; and, in addition, to pay Mrs. Willey $1,500 
per month as temporary support. The parties attempted to treat 
this distribution tax-free to Mrs. Willey by filing joint income 
tax returns. (TR 147) 
ARGUMENT I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN LIMITING 
APPELLANT'S AMOUNT AND DURATION OF ALIMONY. 
The trial court employed the wrong standard to set alimony and 
failed to consider or properly apply necessary factors judicially 
recognized in analyzing an alimony award. 
Those considerations are commonly recited from Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) as follows: 
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the recipient 
spouse; (2) the ability of the recipient spouse to 
produce sufficient income to support herself; and (3) 
11 
the ability of the paying spou.se to provide that 
support, 
Failure \- consider each factor in analyz.aq an alimony 
award ron^tit ifp? -*•> abu*=p of dlscr^ti^ _ "il 
II In," i ; . . - 'tnerwise products ... ^ r 
and convincing evidence which allows the court t- -v i. these 
factors -^. •» mattPf * ]
 rt Aspej; . A?P?JL/ >^ 3 P.^d S7b, 20 x 
( ) • 
Appei.lam. -irgues that the trial court below committed 
error a._ abused itb uiscretion in analyzing each oi the Jones 
factors. 
A. Financial Condition and Needs 
While ih« mrt expressed concern '<^ r the Appellee*-
expenses 
needs. Appeiia,, cl.-imb expenses pi lor - ^ dered sale 
their marital resider<ce ^,905 per month nnd afte^ sal** <~,f 
their home f * *-
reduction r. mui^ju^ payments ttom $2,ouU yt-i <m r $ 
rent. 
"I"IIIin" ( ' i H I r t i H I 111 in I i i H I * ) i i h i 1 l i f w i I i ' ' • Il i II i i j i . i l mi ill II 11 
1 -reri ut any oxpenses a s s o c i a t e d wltli iihiuii" ridi"er 
i^ :: m s i d e r i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s o v e r a l l n e e d s . 
During t h e p a r t i e s ' one yem sppat . i l dm '"In ip<> il I i H » p. m l 
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the following obligations for his wife's support under the 
temporary order of support: 
Mortgage $2,492 
Marital installment obligations 360^ 
Support payments 1,500 
Total monthly temporary support $4,352 
The District Court's final order continued Appellant's 
support at $1,500 per month for only one year but failed to 
consider the following additional obligations which Appellant 
will be required to pay and satisfy: 
1. Rent of $1,100 per month to replace shelter when 
the parties' home is sold; 
2. Health insurance after the date of the Decree of 
Divorce in the amount of $560 per month (TR at 169); 
3. Obligations imposed upon Appellant by the Decree 
of Divorce to pay one-half of the marital debt which includes an 
approximate $11,000 debt to First Interstate Bank payable at $360 
per month and whatever deficiency maybe due on the notes to Mrs* 
Johnson following the sale of the parties' residence.4 
The parties' promissory note payment to Mrs. Johnson in the 
amount of $87 0.52 was deferred pending sale of home. Since the 
date of trial, the parties house was sold by order of the trial 
court, which sale will produce an approximate $37,000 deficiency, 
one-half of which appellant must pay under the Decree of Divorce. 
The amount due as of November 1, 1991 on both notes secured 
by a second trust deed on the home totalled $80,759.90 (Ex. 15 
D). The parties continue to owe monthly payments of $870.52 and 
have missed nine payments since the date of trial to July, 1992 
totalling $7,834.68 together with interest thereon at an agreed 
12%. The home sold for approximately $305,000 producing a 
deficiency of $36,944 calculated as follows: 
13 
4. Taxes associated with Appellant's i 
<j I. i mony. 
Not cnly r1' 1 Appellant lose tb*- I*- -fi*- " her 
mortgage and marital debt b » ^ o ••=»! ** ^r^n.~~,~j «^ more 
, , -t. 
She went tiom niuia.hi;- support or $4,^-^ ic • po. f : $1,500 with 
additions hliqat^- -• nt $^,^40, for a total loss of pre-
[p(,,?h 
The -- . m o Appellant arp *-•- *-r measured by the 
standard • : i i w n g t iwyed ourino t "w- marriage together with the 
j a > * i — ' 
v . Howel, , . Ui an Af»p - ^  i . learl , both parties 
experiencec a : *r\ s a n d a r d >f J • v i no duri-nn • ,x«=> marriage which 
allowed luxurious 
$ : 0. expens. ;e .-ulomoo. ^pt* i id- i . ,« - T~'— 
Wagoneer and Appelle -< • * SEL Mercedes Ben ily 
v ^ a** ^ n'" . ot w * - • • i - * - * i 
s '«. . ^  - . -. ,^ f ~. . »aiu scnoo^ny ,* • ^xiani ,- j h n u r e n and 
House sale $305,000,00) 
Less: cost of sale (""M ( 21,350.00) 
first mortgage (232,000.00) 
notes secured b^ *«ed (88,594.58) 
N e t i»ri it i11in i , ($36,944.58) 
bRent $610; health insurance $550; one-half First 
Interstate Bank $180; taxes on $1,500 support at 22% eo 
total added obligations $1,680. 
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all of the trappings of people enjoying a high standard of living 
and station in the community. 
The parties funded this high standard of living through 
their earnings (Exhibit 34 D), and maintained it during periods 
of income fluctuation through credit made available from the 
Appellant's parents, borrowings from the parties1 401(k) 
programs, the appellee's employer, banks and other readily 
available sources. While the parties incurred debt in order to 
maintain this lifestyle, the debt incurred was certainly within 
their capacity to pay and was voluntarily incurred by Mr. Willey. 
Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint for Divorce, 
Appellant was able to maintain a reduced but comfortable standard 
of living; she continued to reside in the parties1 home, had use 
of $1,500 per month non-taxable support, and remained a dependant 
under her husband's health insurance program. Her children were 
not able to continue in private schools, and she was not able to 
continue her schooling, take vacations, purchase expensive 
clothing or live to the standard previously enjoyed. 
After the District Court's final award of alimony, and 
after the sale of the parties' residence, she will have available 
to her, now subject to tax, her child support of $330 per month, 
her net earnings of $664 (Ex. 370) and the ordered alimony. 
However, she will also have additional debt burden of $24,000, 
and the extra need to fund rent, taxes and health insurance. All 
15 
of these additional burdens will reduce her comparable resources 
from $5,346 to $324 per month/ 
B. Ability of Spouse to Provide For Her Own Support. 
In spite of testimony that Appellant had not worked 
full-time in competitive employment for the nine years of 
marriage and was averaging only $628 gross per month from her two 
jobs (book sales and supplemental literature classes associated 
with the bookstore)(TR at 58) the Court found, based upon 
Appellant's education and circumstances, that she should be able 
to earn between $1,500 and $2,000 per month, recognizing it may 
take her "a little bit of time to get to that level", but "should 
be there within 12 to 24 months". (TR of Decision p.8). 
Appellant called upon a vocational expert, the Human 
Relations Manager of Bonneville Corporation, who testified that a 
42 year-old woman with an outdated Bachelor of Arts education who 
had not established marketable current skills and had not 
Resources Before Divorce 
Mortgage 
Debts 
Support 
Child Support 
Earnings 
$2 
1 
,492 
360 
,500 
330 
664 
$5,346 
Reduced resources by 
added burdens: 
Resources After Divorce 
Net available: 
Before: 
Rent 1,100 
Health Ins. 560 
First Interstate 180 
Deficiency (24,000) ? 
Taxes 330 
$5,346 After: 
$ 
1 
0 
0 
,500 
330 
664 
$2,494 
$2,170 
$ 324 
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maintained employment for ten years, needed rehabilitation in 
order to upgrade her skills and education, unless she is to be 
relegated to unskilled sales or other under-paid positions. The 
expert testified that without financial help, Appellant was 
likely to become a public charge. (TR at 127-131). The expert's 
testimony was subjected to cross-examination but not controverted 
by competent evidence. The testimony was, however, completely 
discredited by the Trial Judge upon the assumption that it was 
given by an "acquaintance" and was therefore manufactured, or 
because the expert had intended to charge for her services which 
the Court found to be "unfortunate". (TR at 145-146).7 
The Court's finding that Appellant could earn between 
$1,500 and $2,000 per month is simply not consistent with her 
skills, her actual earnings, her abilities or the evidence and is 
based solely upon an assumption and speculation that as a 
"presentable woman" (TR 142) she is competent to obtain and 
maintain such employment8. 
During the two years prior to the trial in this matter, 
Appellant worked three to four days per week at $5.00 per hour 
and taught approximately five classes per month at nights earning 
an average of $628 gross income. (TR at 58). In order to earn 
Appellant questions the trial court's reasoning, believing 
that many men have "acquaintances" in the business world whose 
testimony would not be discredited for that reason alone. 
Appellee's counsel in cross-examination of Appellant and 
her expert, attempted to demonstrate that Mrs. Willey could 
qualify as a teacher ($18,000) or sell clothing at Nordstrom 
(apparently speculating without evidence that Nordstrom pays 
$1,500 to $2,000 per month). 
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the $2,000 per month projected by the Trial Court Judge, she 
would have to increase her hourly wage from $5.00 to $12,50 per 
hour. Had she been able to work full-time at $5.00 per hour, her 
actual earnings would have been $800, less taxes, for net take-
home pay of $623.80. (TR at 62). 
C. Ability of Paying Spouse to Provide Support. 
The District Court found, albeit "conservatively" that 
Appellee had the financial ability to earn $110,000 exclusive of 
other employment benefits paid him. (TR of decision at p.7). 
Appellant's actual earnings are set forth on Exhibit 34 D or 
plaintiff's Exhibit 3 P. The Court apparently made that 
calculation by averaging income over the full nine years of the 
marriage (TR 184-185) at approximately $90,000 per year and by 
taking a six year average between 1987 and 1991 but only using a 
year-to-date figure of earned income in 1991 in the amount of 
$126,000. The Court then averaged earnings by excluding the high 
year of 1986 in order to support an approximate average of 
$110,000. 
The actual amount of earned income reported to November 
1, 1991 was $126,095 for just the first ten months of that year. 
The trial Court expressed confidence that the difference between 
its finding of average earnings of $110,000 and the actual ten 
month earning of $126,000 is insignificant enough to avoid a 
finding of abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals (TR 187). 
Yet, that difference of $16,000 for 10 months and almost $30,000 
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for annualized income represents more than full year's earned 
income which the Court found Appellant capable of earning. 
It is uncontroverted that the court's average findings 
do not include an additional $12,308 of benefits received by Mr. 
Willey, (TR 172) nor do they include the deferred bonus of up to 
4% of his production (TR 153). Accordingly, Appellee has a 
significant income earning ability and the clear opportunity to 
earn substantially more. 
Appellee testified that his own expenses, other than 
attorney's fees and installment obligations, were only $2,600 per 
month. This included approximately $800 per month for his leased 
450 SEL Mercedes Benz automobile. 
The Court's conservative finding of $110,000 gross 
earnings would produce monthly income of $9,166.66 per month 
subject to taxes. Assuming a 30% withholding for taxes, that 
still leaves net income available under the Court's own findings 
of $6,416.20 per month. Following sale of the parties' 
residence, Appellee will be relieved of $2,492 per month in house 
payments and will only be paying to Appellant $1,500 in tax 
deductible alimony payments, leaving him at least $5,000 to 
support his $2,400 per month expenses with an additional savings 
of some $2,500 per month. Clearly Appellee has the financial 
ability not only to pay the ordered support, but a significant 
amount more; he also has the ability to pay all of the parties' 
marital debts and obligations. 
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Appellant argued below that for similar reasons 
expressed by the Court of Appeals in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 
P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), the trial court's use of average 
earnings over a long period of time, without giving substantial 
weight to actual earnings in the year of divorce constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. 
An additional effect of the Court's findings will 
prohibit applicant from ever seeking adjustment of support based 
upon changed circumstances related to Appellee's income. §30-3-
5(3) Utah Code (Ann. 1953 as amended) authorizes retained 
jurisdiction to modify support awards where a change of 
circumstance has occurred. When the Court, however, determines 
earnings by using a long-term average, the Appellant is deprived 
of a significant protection should the paying spouse's earnings 
significantly increase. 
In February 1991, the parties had reached a stipulation 
regarding temporary support based upon Mr. Willey's then 
represented annual income of $81,000 for 1990 and Appellant's 
income of $500 per month (Ex. R 13). The Commissioner approved 
that stipulated support of $1,500 per month (Ex. R 40) after 
argument by Appellee that he actually made $92,000 of income (Ex. 
R 23). The trial court, in the final Decree, approved a 
substantially reduced support based upon average income of 
$110,000 per year, inspite of the fact that actual earnings were 
projected for 1991 at $140,000 per year. This variance between 
$81,000 and $140,000 per year constitutes a $60,000 swing in 
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annualized earnings. One would think that would be sufficient to 
demonstrate a change of circumstance for future modifications. 
For the reasons expressed herein, Appellant believes 
that the Court abused its discretion by using a "conservative" 
average, by not considering actual earnings, by failing to 
consider a substantial benefit package available to Appellee and 
not available to the Appellant,and by failing to consider 
substantial bonuses. Having made its decision on Appellee's 
earning power, the trial court seemed less than interested in any 
evidence demonstrating Mr. Willey's future earning capacity and 
opportunities. (TR at 195). 
It is also clear that the trial court (1) failed to 
make findings of fact concerning the appellant's needs; 
(2) failed to make findings consistent with the evidence 
concerning her abilities to contribute to her own needs; and 
(3) failed to properly consider the Appellee's significant 
ability to generate substantial income. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE STANDARD 
FOR AN AWARD OF ALIMONY 
After examining the three Jones factors, the Utah Court of 
Appeals held that alimony be set as permitted to "approximate the 
parties' standard of living during the marriage as closely as 
possible". Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 at 1212 (Utah App. 
1991). Alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic 
needs, but should also consider the recipient spouses' station in 
life. Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1978), Gardner 
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v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). Rudman v. Rudman, 812 
P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
The factual situation presented in Howell v. Howell was 
relatively similar to that presented here. The court in Howell 
made specific findings as to the plaintiff's and defendant's 
gross incomes. It did not, however, make the required findings 
as to defendant's financial needs, although she testified to 
monthly expenses of approximately $5,000. The court in Howell 
was presented with a woman in her 50's having spent most of her 
marriage raising and caring for the children of the marriage. 
The court stated that the wife's 
likelihood of achieving significant salary levels in the 
future is slim. The alimony set by the court does not come 
close to equalizing the parties' standard of living as of 
the time of the divorce, but allows plaintiff a two to four 
times advantage. We, therefore, hold that the alimony 
amount set by the Court was clearly erroneous. 
Ld at 1213. 
Appellant here argues that her situation is similar to 
that presented not only in Howell but also in Bell v. Bell, 810 
P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991). Both situations present a wife 
essentially dependent upon the significant earnings of her 
husband during the marriage; she earned little and essentially 
stayed at home raising children. While it is true that 
Appellant's children are not the natural children of Appellee, it 
cannot be ignored that Appellant faces the problem of maintaining 
and raising those children as best she can without the children 
or herself becoming a public charge. It is further true that 
Appellant is little equipped to compete for high paying jobs and 
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is advancing in age. The standard announced by the Court of 
Appeals in Howell was an attempt to equalize the parties' post-
divorce status in order to better equip both parties to go 
forward with their separate lives with relatively equal odds. 
The trial court in the matter stated, in discussing the 
Howell standard: 
. . . if the Court of Appeals directed that that is the 
standard, then the Court would be inclined, would obviously 
have a compulsion, because of controlling authority, to 
follow that. In the five years that I've been on the bench 
I have found that almost no case will justify the equalizing 
of income. There are circumstances that just simply, and 
facts, that just simply compel one to deal otherwise, and 
that, as a motivator or as an objective, seems to me to be, 
perhaps, in an individual case, something that could be 
pursued, for instance, if people had been married for a long 
period of time and in their retirement years they determined 
to separate, then I could understand that potential. But 
when one is as these parties are, where there are 
approximately a quarter-century of productive years 
remaining, if not more, that is certainly not my reading of 
the law nor my desire. I don't think it is appropriate, and 
I don't think it is likely in this case. (TR at 381) 
The case law appears to adopt differing standards of 
alimony based upon the abilities of the paying spouse. Where the 
parties cannot maintain the standard of living enjoyed by them 
during the marriage, then the minimum standard must be that 
amount which keeps the recipient spouse from becoming a public 
charge. English v, English, 565 P.2d 409, (Utah 1977). However, 
where the joint income of the paying and receiving spouse is 
sufficient to approximate their standard of living, the Court 
should attempt to set alimony in order to "equalize the parties' 
post-divorce status". While that may not mean equal distribution 
of available income, it must consider the recipient's overall 
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financial needs as well as her practical and actual ability to 
contribute to her own support, and the paying spousefs ability to 
finance that standard. 
The duration of the marriage should not be a 
significant controlling factor once it is determined that alimony 
is appropriate. Appellant does not consider nine plus years of 
marriage short-term, especially where she provided marital 
services to Appellee during the "best years of her life". These 
are years which could have been devoted to full-time employment, 
and to creating an opportunity to earn significant income. 
Instead, the parties chose through their acts, deeds and specific 
requests to live for nine years in a marital relationship with 
Mrs. Willey assuming the more traditional role of homemaker and 
caretaker to her children. These were the same years when 
Appellee's income rose from an average of approximately $57,000 
during the first four years of marriage to well over $110,000 
during the latter six years of marriage. 
It is difficult to tell what, if any, standards the 
Trial Court used in analyzing or setting alimony in this matter. 
The Court announced that it would not follow the standards set 
forth in Howell v. Howell; the Court failed to make findings 
related to the Appellantfs financial needs; the Court would not 
consider Appellant's obligations towards her natural children, 
nor would it reduce income available for her own support by 
whatever amount was necessary to meet her legal obligations of 
support to her own children; the Court failed to consider how 
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Appellant would make up the deficiency of income over expenses, 
requiring Appellant to pay 50% of marital debts and obligations 
even though total income available for support was insufficient. 
Finally, the trial court denied Appellant's request for 
rehabilitative alimony. Peterson v. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 
App. 1987). In short, the Court's analysis and award of alimony 
constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) . 
ARGUMENT III 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER 
APPELLANT'S OBLIGATIONS TO HER NATURAL CHILDREN. 
Section 78-45-4.1 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended) clearly 
provides that a stepfather has an obligation to support his 
stepchildren during the course of a marriage and until that 
marriage is terminated by Decree of Divorce. 
Yet our courts have not expressed how the natural parent's 
obligations toward her children are to be considered in analyzing 
her needs for purposes of setting alimony. Appellant's 
uncontroverted testimony is that she requires $5,400 to meet her 
expenses including the expenses associated with the care of her 
natural children. She testifies that she receives $330 per month 
in child support from the children's natural father. Appellee 
has no further obligation toward child support, but does and 
should have an obligation to continue his wife in that standard 
enjoyed by the parties during the marriage. To what extent the 
Court can employ a fiction to avoid consideration of Appellant's 
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legal obligation of support to her children, has not yet been 
clarified by our Courts, 
Appellant argues that her obligations to her children 
must first be considered by reducing her earned income available 
for their support, and by recognizing her increased financial 
needs. Appellant does not argue that certain expenses separately 
associated with the care of the children be continued by 
Appellee, such as private tuition and certain entertainment 
expenses clearly associated with the children's individual needs. 
However, to the extent her housing requires more than a one-
bedroom apartment because she is the custodian of two minor 
children, and to the extent that the law obligates Appellant to 
provide education, food, clothing and shelter to her children, 
those financial obligations must be recognized by the trial court 
in fixing an award of alimony to her, 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REQUIRING EQUAL 
APPELLANT TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MARITAL DEBT. 
For reasons expressed in Arguments I and II above, the trial 
court abused its discretion in dividing marital debt, because it 
failed to consider either the applicant's ability to pay such 
debt or the disparity between Appellant's and Appellee's ability 
to earn income or satisfy debt. 
The court ordered Appellant to be equally responsible for $11,000 
of debt with First Interstate Bank in Mr. Willey's name, inspite 
of the fact that much of that debt was incurred by him subsequent 
to the parties' separation. (TR 194 and 307). The court further 
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obligated Appellant to pay one-half of any deficiency on the two 
promissory notes due and owing to Mrs. Johnson which notes had 
been secured by the marital home. That debt has since been 
established at approximately $37,900. Appellant received little 
if any property settlement that could be used to offset her share 
of this substantial debt. She is technically and practicably 
insolvent. Just as the relative abilities of each spouse may be 
important to an equitable distribution of assets, so too, is it 
important to a division o;f debt. Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 
(Utah 1988). 
Even Appellee suggested in his proposed resolution of 
this matter before the trial judge that he should be responsible 
for marital debt recognizing that she will never have the 
ability. (Ex. 49-P, TR 336). 
For the reasons expressed in Arguments I and II above, 
it was err for the court to impose equal obligations where the 
parties1 earning abilities are so substantially disproportionate. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
ERROR IN FAILING TO PROVIDE APPELLANT 
CONSIDERATION FOR PREMARITAL ASSETS 
Appellant entered into this marriage with a $29,000 
equity in her own home and the security of a good job. She 
leaves the marriage with no home, substantial debt and little 
ability to provide for her own support and maintenance. 
Appellee, on the other hand, began this marriage with no property 
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and a reasonable income. He leaves the marriage with substantial 
income and comparatively small debt burdens. 
In this context, Appellant argued to the trial court 
that the court should recognize her premarital contribution in 
order to leave her some equity to provide for herself and her 
children. This would have been accomplished had the trial court 
recognized that one of the two promissory notes, subsequently 
secured by the parties' marital home, be considered the separate 
obligation of Mr. Willey, since most of the proceeds were used 
for the purchase of his Mercedes automobile and since he, not 
she, has the ability to pay and satisfy such notes. This 
analysis would have left some equity after the sale of the 
parties' home with which to provide Appellant a portion of her 
premarital equity. The trial court found that because Appellant 
allowed her equity to be used in the purchase of subsequent 
homes, she lost the premarital treatment of such contribution 
through co-mingling. The court, accordingly, denied her claim 
inspite of uncontroverted testimony that Mr. Willey had always 
treated her contribution as her own separate property, and 
inspite of her ability to trace her separate contribution in each 
of the subsequent home purchases made by the parties. 
Finally, by holding that the two notes owing to Mrs. 
Johnson and secured by the home must be paid solely from proceeds 
of the home, Appellant lost the opportunity to claim any 
recognition for her separate premarital equity into this 
marriage. 
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Appellant contends that the court erred in apply 
Mortenson v. Mortenson, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) by simply 
holding that her consent to use her premarital equity in the 
subsequent purchases of homes automatically lost its treatment as 
separate property. The court could have and should have 
fashioned a remedy which recognized Appellant's separate 
contribution prior to a division of assets or debts. In 
Mortenson the court held that property separately acquired by one 
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its 
value, should be awarded to that spouse unless the property has 
been consumed or its identity lost through co-mingling or 
exchanges, or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an 
interest therein to the other spouse. 370 P.2d at 308. The fact 
that Appellant's equity in her premarital home was exchanged for 
equity in two other homes is not in and of itself a "co-mingling 
or an exchange" which would automatically cause a loss of its 
identity. She is simply exchanging her premarital equity in a 
home for subsequent premarital equities. To hold otherwise would 
essentially destroy any opportunity for parties to upgrade their 
living conditions during subsequent marriages; this would be an 
economic absurdity. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 
1990) . 
Appellant argues that the only legitimate question left 
is whether or not the equity was "consumed" such that there is 
nothing to distribute. It is Appellant's belief that the court 
would not consider her arguments to separately treat the Johnson 
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notes, not as debt against the home but as personal debt t 
I I r "Ii Ii ] ] e] si i ic e tl: 1 E? coti i: I: 1 lad a ] re 'ady made a determinat . .  -.a 
she lost the identity of her separate property through co-
mingling. 
ARGUMENT V I 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO AWARD 
APPELLANT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT REQUESTED. 
It is clearly within the court's discretion to award 
fees based upon evidence of; the financial rippd of the recipient 
s p c 111 IMiii" i >l l i t - 1 S | H h i s i I 11 I , .1 I I h e 
reasonableness L «..:>- Rashband v. Rashband, 752 P. 2d 133] 
1 337 (Utar- \i.-< "•.'- : :^ * ' permit review, however, 
courts are encoi e s p 1 .i i in i rig i Iio f a c t o r s 
whi ch t h e y c o n s i d e r e d ,.*-*..• ./.j<ii i . iward. Morgan v . Morgan, 
795 P.2< ; '•; •. i * 
One? ; • 9 
is ont i i . . . . - , abuse iiscret 
award less than • claimed amount without some reasonable 
justification to the contrary. 
4 2b (UUili App. l'J'U)); bell v. Bell, 810 "* *- , — 
The only comment made . i ;* t . : t u* v s that it 
was unfortunat hat both parties nau L - * s 
i tile the ^  lutinn of , .aii.o^e. (TR of 
Decision &\ i. Nowhere : t , .. charged 
the Appellant were unreasonable. Accordingly, Appellant shnuhl 
be "ri1 i I 1 <,'-! I I'lii. .iii'.j.i. i ii I'M' .I I. I. lees claimed as well as an award 
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for attorney's fees incurred in this appeal. Bell v. Bell, 810 
P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991). 
REQUESTED RELIEF AND CONCLUSION 
Appellant received as a distribution of property in 
this matter her automobile, premarital gifted stock (which her 
husband had earlier placed into their I.R.A. account), one-half 
of a 401K plan with a net value of $12,000 and furniture and 
personal property in her possession. She also received one-half 
of a vested bonus to be received January 2, 1992 in the 
approximate gross amount of $8,000. 
Neither the I.R.A. nor 401K awards are available to 
Appellant without incurring substantial tax payments and 
penalties. (TR 311). Appellant is left with debts, including 
unpaid attorney's fees of approximately $38,000, without the 
earning capacity to repay any such amounts. 
Appellant, on the other hand, received an equal amount 
of property and debts but has the earning capacity to satisfy all 
such debts and to begin to successfully pursue his future with 
substantial income and credit available to him. Clearly, these 
parties are nowhere close to an equalization of opportunity. 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), Appellant 
faces bankruptcy while Appellee enjoys a strong financial future. 
The court's division of assets, its failure to consider 
Appellant's premarital equity, its imposition of debts upon 
Appellant without the ability to pay, its failure to recognize 
the substantial disparity between the parties' earning 
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capacities, its imptsiti^. - reducing alimony, and its fail ure 
to consider substant w I i :i cl 1 fa- : e P. ppeJ lai it i lpor i 
sa le of her hous^- < .,**., demonstrate ai 1 a buse of discretion 
this matter, Appellant requests that this court evaluate that 
evidence which was submitted and wh ii c l : i stands 1 incont .rover ted a s 
i leecis , and, fashion its own remedy and specific 
guidelines for the tri al court to fol low in :i mposing a fair and 
equ i tab1e de cre e of d i vo r c e. 
T 1 :t,e I i p p e i ] an I i s i n s o l v e n t and wit hum L I lu« a b i l i t y t o 
pay h e r d e b t s and ob i i g a t i o n b . T h i s , by d e l i r u t i o n , makes h e r a 
p u b l i c c h a r g e * ^1 c o u r t ' s d i v i s i o n of d e b t a n d a w a r d o i 
su wil.li i In1 inn i i! P n'IIK-MI i a r y s t a n d a r d of 
a l i m o n y , ; ;- runiuni of n e c e s s i t i e s , b a s i c n e e d s , and t o 
a s s u r e t h a t A p p e l l a n t d o e s n o t become a p u b l i c c h a r g e . Y e t , t h e 
t r i a ] coi ir t: fa i ] ed t ::: tM/alual <« t he p a r t HM- -I iindaj i I i I I n \ i nq f 
i n c l u d i n g t h e i r c u s t o m a r y or p r o p e r s t a t u s in t h e community , in 
o r d e r t o s e t aLimony as p e r m i t t e d at t h e p a r t i e s 1 s t a n d a r d of 
J iv i i i f j i l u r i m j I In nrnr i i«jqp lluw^l 1 j , i i o w e l l , o iu I j j LID" ul 
]212 (ULah App, 199 1 | , 
A c c o r d i n g l y , A p p e l l a n t p r a y s tha t : t h i s c o u r t r e v e r s e 
and remand 
I . : .« , « . .. . i n c . LO f a s h i o n .<* remedy c o n s i s t t , AILM u i a n 
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law and equitable considerations. Appellant also requests an 
award of attorney fees and costs incurred for this Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of August 1992, 
By 
Roger D. Sandack (2856) 
Attorney for Appellant 
Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
('n I 11. lMh day of August, 1992, true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OK APPELLANT was hand delivered to 
the following: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
50 West 300 South, #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
16007 " 
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ADDENDUM 
ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN P. WTLLEY, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON 
Defendant. ] 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS rt" r * W 
Civil No. 91 490 0101 
1 Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 21 and 22, 1991. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant 
was present and represented bs ' . . d 
arguments : .., < , JU .I* iiz^ *uLy 
advised, now makes and enters the following: 
Findings of Fact 
I- Residence, Plaintiff a nci defendant were bona i ide residents of Salt I ,ake 
County, Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of this action. 
2, Marriage. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having been 
married on April 29,1982, in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
EXHIBIT "A11 
FILES 3SSTS2C7 GGU^T 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 h 1992 
SALT L^ECOUNTY 
""""""" Deputy Clerk 
3. Children. No children have been born as issue of this marriage, and none 
are expected. 
4. Grounds for Divorce. During the marriage, irreconcilable differences have 
developed between the parties making continuation of their marriage impossible. 
Each party is entitled to a decree of divorce from the other party. 
5. Real Property. During the marriage, the parties acquired a house and real 
property located at 2605 East Maywood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. The house 
should be sold as soon as feasible because it constitutes a substantial financial burden 
for the parties. The house should be listed at a price of $350,000 with a new real 
estate agent to be agreed upon by the parties as soon as the present listing agreement 
expires. Upon sale of the house, the first mortgage in the approximate amount of 
$232,000 to Zions Bank should be paid in full, and the second mortgage in the 
approximate amount of $80,000 to Beverly Johnson should be paid in full, together 
with all costs of sale. Any net proceeds of the sale then remaining should be divided 
as follows: 
(a) If the house is sold within 90 days of the date of November 22, 1991, 
all remaining net proceeds of sale should be awarded to defendant. 
(b) If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22, 
1991, the parties should divide any net proceeds equally. 
(c) In the event that the sales price of the house is not sufficient to pay 
the first and second mortgages and costs of sale, the parties shall be equally 
responsible for payment of any short fall or deficiency. 
-2-
Plaintiff should fnahnaa i,n tn'ik*1 Ilia itrst tiiui tya^a payment until the house is 
Payment of the second mortgage shall continue to be deferred. Defendant may 
remain in possession of the hou^. uai;" it ; ^!a 
6 Automobiles, Ine cut - ne 
1988 1 .andcruise* l .: • npf. vai • :v . payment ? '. - encumbrance ther-.~ 
$7,000. The Landcruiser -aan ar awarded i<- defendant. The • -m. * an<a~ u-ji 
1987 Mercedes hasa- M *• sir:-, t -* *:>i.-v! a r« ••«•»-. 
Assume and pa> 1 .„.-.;* • • . • ' defendant Lunulas uieretrom. 
Individual Retirement Account. The individua ^lir^int, :t account In the 
name of Rosalind Willey should be divided as follows: 
(a) The stock in A merican Telephone a nci' IVIe^raph should be awarded 
to defendant since it was a family gift to her. 
lb) The cash amounts in the individual retirement account should be 
divided equally between the par lias 
8
" KilK Plan. The 40IK plan has a net value of approximately $24,000, 
which should be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff should repay the loan 
to the 401K plan and should be entitled to the benefit of any innvasr in I hr valaa of 
the 401K plan accruail as a rasuit afthe payment, a(' f ha la,in, 
9, Furniture and Personal Property, The furniture in the parties' home 
should be awarded to defendant. The furniture acquired by plaintiff after the parties' 
separation should be awarded to him, i (j ons 
a . a awarded the 
following personal items currently located in the parties' home: 
i a j Oak chair In den; 
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(b) Oak table and chairs (presently being stored); 
(c) Plaintiffs books; 
(d) Framed maps in the den; 
(e) Framed birds in the master bedroom; 
(f) Brass bird bookends; 
(g) Carved arctic loon; and 
(h) Butter churn. 
Each party should be awarded the other personal property presently in his or her 
possession. 
10. J. G. Willey Limited Partnership. Based on the stipulation of the parties, 
the court finds that this is a premarital asset of no value and awards it to plaintiff. 
11. Pension Plan. Plaintiff currently has a pension plan with his employer, 
Kidder, Peabody & Company. The pension plan should be divided between the 
parties pursuant to the Woodward formula as of November 21, 1991, pursuant to a 
qualified domestic relations order. 
12. Alimony. The court finds that a reasonable average income to use for 
plaintiff in determining alimony to be paid in this matter is $110,000. Because of 
plaintiffs employment as a stock broker, his income has fluctuated. In 1987 and 
1991, plaintiff had unusually good income years. The court further finds tha t 
defendant is capable of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,000 per month, 
based on her education and qualifications. Accordingly, the court finds that it is 
equitable that plaintiff pay alimony to defendant of $1,500 per month for one year 
from the date of trial herein, and $1,000 per month for three years thereafter. The 
court further finds that plaintiff has been supporting defendant during the parties' 
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separation of approximately one yea r, and it is appropriate to take t 
into. anjMii.l, in il" k'nnmmi; ilie ttMin ol aliniony. Alimony shall terminate at the enc 
of four years from the date of trial, or when defendant remarries, cohabits with a 
member of the opposite sex, or dies, whichever first occurs 
13. Decree of UIMUTI* The iinavt> ml uliuiice - : • nal noon 
January 1, 1992. 
14, Deferred Compensation and Bonuses. The o>\ - fir.d.* v- ;i b-j^ed ' ~ -v rk 
already performed - ' :T.- ; .:.. • ;• . ' - . is 
(j n Li t i e d In ;i bom, .< . \.\ * ,
 A i\:J. ] ;(1 ,.,;,. , « :: 0* i\\i< n o u . d ')<: C*\l(h w 
equally between ir.e parties. The e <>±r r.,rr?:» r \"-iuv, "-i.i : / , hi n u ^ s , who h 
plaintiff is entitled to be paid in 1995 nn: :!it.^ .; ' * * . ; . * . 
a re contingent oi .r : . v. .: r\ -ider, ;\:a;,> «v .•* 
Company. Accordingly, if plaintiff it -xiu employed by Kidder P ^ o ^ d y & Cm-par.• 
and receives thot« b. nus >\ the amount 4 :n«,se bonuses >h*u.;.: ^ :<:\ ••;•••: .uany 
between th*» n^r t i ^ . Tim emn't |,\I>"UM,T I'M ids that plain! itV.:, deferred compensation 
... «: ,* :,. ongoing expenses and should not otherwise be divided be 
the parties. Each party shall be responsible for the payment of taxes on the portion of 
the bonuses distributed to that party. 
15 Claim of Premarital Contribution. Defendant asserted a claim, in this 
matter that she made a premarital contribution to the marriage of approximately 
$29,000, consisting of the equity • u •::• owned bwv •* • c a v i i Logan Avenue 
prior the mar " the sale of the 
Logan Avenup h. , ;o commingled with other funds of the parties by 
their h " . v: "-- -:•' ; .-i-p:-. o \ ' : . . l c -i~ premarital property. 
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Accordingly, the court makes no award as a result of the claimed premarital 
contribution. 
16. Joint Tax Return. The parties shall file a joint income tax return for 1991 
and divide any refunds to be received equally. In the event that taxes are due, the 
parties shall each pay one-half of any taxes. 
17. Medical Expenses of Defendant. Defendant underwent surgery in 
September of 1991. The medical expenses incurred in connection with that surgery 
have been submitted for payment to plaintiffs health insurance provider. Any of 
those expenses not paid by insurance should be paid from plaintiffs Complus Plan 
insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do so. In the event that the 
Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, plaintiff should be 
responsible for payment. 
18. First Interstate Advance Line. During the marriage, plaintiff and 
defendant had a credit line with First Interstate Bank. The court finds that the credit 
line was incurred to cover family expenses. Each party should pay one-half of the 
amount due on the credit line as of November 21,1991. 
19. Other Debts and Obligations. Any debts and obligations incurred by the 
parties since their separation should be paid by the party who incurred them. The 
court finds that defendant is not entitled to be reimbursed for tuition incurred by her 
for Spring Quarter of 1991. 
20. Obligation of Blake Johnson. Blake Johnson owes the pa r t i e s 
approximately $2,000 which he pays to them at the rate of approximately $100 per 
month. Defendant should be entitled to receive the payments from Blake Johnson. 
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-
 l...-. * i^t- i; the parties. 
22. Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Plaintiff has pr^-iYi:.- •< :? • U;*M \>ward 
defendant's n*ti»r* .•-'3 fe» and ••*.'• - > w a r d 
z- * ' ' . ! j;. - v\;0c, 1 ,ion ^ar iv diu*.., -; p,i \ ni^ *r he r A V : cos ts 
and fees incurred herein. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes an enters III • 
Conclusions of Law 
1 Each party should be awarded a decree of divorce from the other party, to 
become final 
2 r . personal property of the parties should be awarded as set 
forth in paragraphs 5 *s * ?• i • • < 1 mn 20 of the findings of fact herein. 
3 . '' •"::( ~4 v aid enter o 
.jaragrapi - - ^> iindings « 1 ia,r 
herein. 
4 Plaintiff should M - r.^-t^j n pay alimony to defendant as n 
paragraph \ 
- . .- * plaintiil :n. • ".rjh Kidder, Peabody & Company in 1992, 
1995, and 1996, should be divided betweeii the parties as set forth in paragraph 14 of 
the findings of fact herein Plaintiffs deferred compen sal inn for 1*391 ahuiild U- used 
to pay the nngoing expense,) and shnii Id not otherwise be divided by the parties. Each 
party should be ordered to pay the taxes due on the portion of the bonuses distributed 
to that party. 
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6. Defendant is not entitled to an award of a premarital contribution in the 
amount of $29,000, as set forth in paragraph 15 of the findings of fact herein. 
7. The parties should file a joint income tax return for 1991 and should be 
ordered to divide any refunds to be received equally. The parties should each be 
ordered to pay one-half of any taxes. 
8. Any of defendant's surgery expenses not paid by insurance should be paid 
from plaintiff's Complus Plan, insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do 
so. In the event that the Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, 
plaintiff should be responsible for payment. 
9. The parties should be ordered to pay the debts and obligations incurred 
during the marriage as set forth in paragraphs 18,19, and 20. 
10. The state income tax refund for 1990 should be awarded equally between 
the parties. 
11. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay an additional $3,500 toward defendant's 
attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party should be ordered to pay his or her own costs 
and fees incurred herein. 
DATED this / V ^ a T o f January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE DAVIDS. Y/01JNG 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be delivered to the 
following, this 30th day of December, 1991: 
Roger D. Sandack, Esq. 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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. - - J i Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 * 1992 
ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN P. WILLEY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
> amass 
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY, ) I ~ \ 5 " ^ &~ O ^ 
Civil No. 91 490 0101 
Defendant. ) Judge David S. Young 
) 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 21 and 22, 1991. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant 
was present and represented by her counsel, Roger Sandack. The court having heard 
testimony, received exhibits, heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully 
advised, and having made and entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED: 
1. Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff Glen P. Willey is hereby awarded a decree 
of divorce from defendant Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey, and defendant Rosalind Ann 
Johnson Willey is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from plaintiff Glen P. Willey, 
EXHIBIT "B" 
on grounds of irreconcilable differences, such decree to become final on January 1, 
1992. 
2. Real P r o p e r t y . The house and real property located at 2605 East 
Maywood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah is ordered to be sold as soon as feasible. The 
house shall be listed at a price of $350,000 with a new real estate agent to be agreed 
upon by the parties, as soon as the present listing agreement expires. Upon sale of 
the house, the first mortgage in the approximate amount of $232,000 to Zions Bank is 
ordered to be paid in full, and the second mortgage in the approximate amount of 
$80,000 to Beverly Johnson is ordered to be paid in full, together with all costs of sale. 
Any net proceeds of the sale then remaining are ordered to be divided as follows: 
(a) If the house is sold within 90 days of the date of November 22, 1991, 
all remaining net proceeds of sale are awarded to defendant. 
(b) If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22, 
1991, the parties are ordered to divide any net proceeds equally. 
(c) In the event that the sales price of the house is not sufficient to pay 
the first and second mortgages and costs of sale, the parties are ordered to be 
equally responsible for payment of any short fall or deficiency. 
Plaintiff is ordered to continue to make the first mortgage payment until the 
house is sold. Payment of the second mortgage shall continue to be deferred. 
Defendant may remain in possession of the house until it is sold. 
3. Automobiles . The Landcruiser is awarded to defendant. Plaintiff is 
ordered to assume and pay the lease payments on the 1987 Mercedes, and hold 
defendant harmless therefrom. 
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4. Individual Ret i rement Accoun t The individual retirement account in 
the name of Rosalind Willey is ordered to be divided as follows: 
(a) The stock in American Telephone and Telegraph is awarded to 
defendant since it was a family gift to her. 
(b) The cash amounts in the individual retirement account are ordered 
to be divided equally between the parties. 
5. 401K Plan. The 40 IK plan having a net value of approximately $24,000 
is ordered to be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff is ordered to repay the 
loan to the 40IK plan and is awarded the benefit of any increase in the value of the 
40 IK plan accrued as a result of the payment of the loan. 
6. Furn i ture and Personal Property. The furniture in the parties' home 
is awarded to defendant. The furniture acquired by plaintiff since the parties' 
separation is awarded to him, and he is ordered to assume and pay any obligations 
incurred in connection therewith. In addition, plaintiff is awarded the following 
personal items currently located in the parties' home: 
(a) Oak chair in den; 
(b) Oak table and chairs (presently being stored); 
(c) Plaintiffs books; 
(d) Framed maps in the den; 
(e) Framed birds in the master bedroom; 
(f) Brass bird bookends; 
(g) Carved arctic loon; and 
(h) Butter churn. 
Each party is awarded the other personal property presently in his or her possession. 
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7. J . G. Willey Limited Par tnership , The J. G. Willey Limited Partnership 
is awarded to plaintiff. 
8. Pens ion Plan. The pension plan with Kidder, Peabody & Company is 
ordered to be divided between the parties pursuant to the Woodward formula as of 
November 21,1991, pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order. 
9. Alimony. Plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to defendant in the amount 
of $1,500 per month for one year from the date of trial herein, and $1,000 per month 
for three years thereafter. Alimony shall terminate at the end of four years from the 
date of trial, or when defendant remarries, cohabits with a member of the opposite 
sex, or dies, whichever first occurs. 
10. Deferred Compensa t ion and Bonuses . The amount of the bonus 
plaintiff is entitled to in January of 1992 as a result of his employment with Kidder, 
Peabody & Company is ordered to be divided equally between the parties. Any future 
bonuses which plaintiff is entitled to be paid in 1995 and 1996, and which have been 
earned as of this time and are contingent only upon plaintiffs continued employment 
with Kidder, Peabody & Company, are ordered to be divided equally between the 
parties. Plaintiffs deferred compensation for 1991 is ordered to be used to pay 
ongoing expenses and shall not otherwise be divided be the parties. Each party is 
ordered to pay the taxes on the portion of the bonuses distributed to that party. 
11. J o i n t Tax Return. The parties are ordered to file a joint income tax 
return for 1991 and divide any refunds to be received equally. In the event that taxes 
are due, the parties are ordered to each pay one-half of any taxes. 
12. Medical Expenses of Defendant. Any medical expenses incurred by 
defendant in connection with her surgery in September of 1991 which have not been 
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paid by plaintiffs health insurance provider shall be paid from plaintiffs Complus 
Plan, insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do so. In the event that the 
Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, plaintiff is ordered to be 
responsible for payment. 
13. First Interstate Advance Line, Each party is ordered to pay one-half of 
the amount due on the credit line with First Interstate Bank as of November 21, 
1991. 
14. Other Debts and Obligations. Any debts and obligations incurred by 
the parties since their separation are ordered to be paid by the party who incurred 
them. 
15. Obligation of Blake Johnson . Defendant is awarded the obligation 
from Blake Johnson of $2,000, which he pays at the rate of approximately $100 per 
month. 
16. State Tax Refund for 1990. The state income tax refund for 1990 is 
ordered to be divided equally between the parties. 
17. At torneys ' Fees and Costs. Plaintiff is ordered to pay an additional 
$3,500 toward defendant's attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party is ordered to pay his 
or her own costs and fees incurred herein. 
DATED this ML day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
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